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Opinion of the Court 
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order 
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
_________________ 
No. 031160 
_________________ 
AZEL P. SMITH, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. CITY OF 
JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[March 30, 2005] 
 JUSTICE STEVENS announced the judgment of the Court 
and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to 
Parts I, II, and IV, and an opinion with respect to Part III, 
in which JUSTICE SOUTER, JUSTICE GINSBURG, AND 
JUSTICE BREYER join. 
 Petitioners, police and public safety officers employed by 
the city of Jackson, Mississippi (hereinafter City), contend 
that salary increases received in 1999 violated the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) be-
cause they were less generous to officers over the age of 40 
than to younger officers.  Their suit raises the question 
whether the disparate-impact theory of recovery an-
nounced in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971), 
for cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, is cognizable under the ADEA.  Despite the age of the 
ADEA, it is a question that we have not yet addressed.  See 
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U. S. 604, 610 (1993); 
Markham v. Geller, 451 U. S. 945 (1981) (REHNQUIST, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
I 
 On October 1, 1998, the City adopted a pay plan grant-
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ing raises to all City employees.  The stated purpose of the 
plan was to attract and retain qualified people, provide 
incentive for performance, maintain competitiveness with 
other public sector agencies and ensure equitable compen-
sation to all employees regardless of age, sex, race and/or 
disability.1  On May 1, 1999, a revision of the plan, which 
was motivated, at least in part, by the Citys desire to 
bring the starting salaries of police officers up to the re-
gional average, granted raises to all police officers and 
police dispatchers.  Those who had less than five years of 
tenure received proportionately greater raises when com-
pared to their former pay than those with more seniority.  
Although some officers over the age of 40 had less than 
five years of service, most of the older officers had more. 
 Petitioners are a group of older officers who filed suit 
under the ADEA claiming both that the City deliberately 
discriminated against them because of their age (the 
disparate-treatment claim) and that they were ad-
versely affected by the plan because of their age (the 
disparate-impact claim).  The District Court granted 
summary judgment to the City on both claims.  The Court 
of Appeals held that the ruling on the former claim was 
premature because petitioners were entitled to further 
discovery on the issue of intent, but it affirmed the dis-
missal of the disparate-impact claim.  351 F. 3d 183 (CA5 
2003). Over one judges dissent, the majority concluded 
that disparate-impact claims are categorically unavailable 
under the ADEA.  Both the majority and the dissent as-
sumed that the facts alleged by petitioners would entitle 
them to relief under the reasoning of Griggs. 
 We granted the officers petition for certiorari, 541 U. S. 
___ (2004), and now hold that the ADEA does authorize 
recovery in disparate-impact cases comparable to Griggs.  
Because, however, we conclude that petitioners have not 
 
1 App. 15. 
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Opinion of the Court 
set forth a valid disparate-impact claim, we affirm. 
II 
 During the deliberations that preceded the enactment of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress considered and 
rejected proposed amendments that would have included 
older workers among the classes protected from employ-
ment discrimination.2  General Dynamics Land Systems, 
Inc. v. Cline, 540 U. S. 581, 587 (2004).  Congress did, 
however, request the Secretary of Labor to make a full 
and complete study of the factors which might tend to 
result in discrimination in employment because of age and 
of the consequences of such discrimination on the economy 
and individuals affected.  §715, 78 Stat. 265.  The Secre-
tarys report, submitted in response to Congress request, 
noted that there was little discrimination arising from 
dislike or intolerance of older people, but that arbitrary 
discrimination did result from certain age limits.  Report 
of the Secretary of Labor, The Older American Worker: 
Age Discrimination in Employment 22 (June 1965), re-
printed in U. S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion, Legislative History of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (1981) (hereinafter Wirtz Report).  More-
over, the report observed that discriminatory effects re-
sulted from [i]nstitutional arrangements that indirectly 
restrict the employment of older workers.  Id., at 15. 
 In response to that report Congress directed the Secre-
tary to propose remedial legislation, see Fair Labor Stan-
dards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. 89601, §606, 80 Stat. 
845, and then acted favorably on his proposal.  As enacted 
in 1967, §4(a)(2) of the ADEA, now codified as 29 U. S. C. 
§623(a)(2), provided that it shall be unlawful for an em-
ployer to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any 
 
2 See 110 Cong. Rec. 25962599 (1964) (amendment offered by Rep. 
Dowdy, voted down 123 to 94); id., at 99119913, 1349013492 (amend-
ment offered by Sen. Smathers, voted down 63 to 28). 
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way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual 
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, because of such individuals 
age . . . .  81 Stat. 603.  Except for substitution of the 
word age for the words race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin, the language of that provision in the 
ADEA is identical to that found in §703(a)(2) of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).  Other provisions of the 
ADEA also parallel the earlier statute.3  Unlike Title VII, 
however, §4(f)(1) of the ADEA, 81 Stat. 603, contains 
language that significantly narrows its coverage by per-
mitting any otherwise prohibited action where the 
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than 
age (hereinafter RFOA provision). 
III 
 In determining whether the ADEA authorizes disparate-
impact claims, we begin with the premise that when Con-
gress uses the same language in two statutes having 
similar purposes, particularly when one is enacted shortly 
after the other, it is appropriate to presume that Congress 
intended that text to have the same meaning in both 
statutes.  Northcross v. Board of Ed. of Memphis City 
Schools, 412 U. S. 427, 428 (1973) (per curiam).  We have 
consistently applied that presumption to language in the 
ADEA that was derived in haec verba from Title VII.  
 
3 Like Title VII with respect to all protected classes except race, the 
ADEA provides an affirmative defense to liability where age is a bona 
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal opera-
tion of the particular business . . . , §4(f)(1), 81 Stat. 603; Cf. Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, §703(e), 78 Stat. 256 (Notwithstanding any other provision of 
this title, . . . it shall not be [unlawful to perform any of the prohibited 
activities in §§703(a)(d)] on the basis of his religion, sex, or national 
origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a 
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal 
operation of that particular business enterprise . . .). 
4
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Opinion of STEVENS, J. 
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 584 (1978). 4  Our unani-
mous interpretation of §703(a)(2) of the Title VII in Griggs 
is therefore a precedent of compelling importance. 
 In Griggs, a case decided four years after the enactment 
of the ADEA, we considered whether §703 of Title VII 
prohibited an employer from requiring a high school 
education or passing of a standardized general intelligence 
test as a condition of employment in or transfer to jobs 
when (a) neither standard is shown to be significantly 
related to successful job performance, (b) both require-
ments operate to disqualify Negroes at a substantially 
higher rate than white applicants, and (c) the jobs in 
question formerly had been filled only by white employees 
as part of a longstanding practice of giving preference to 
whites.  401 U. S., at 425426.  Accepting the Court of 
Appeals conclusion that the employer had adopted the 
diploma and test requirements without any intent to 
discriminate, we held that good faith does not redeem 
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that oper-
ate as built-in headwinds for minority groups and are 
unrelated to measuring job capability.  Id., at 432. 
 We explained that Congress had directed the thrust of 
the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not 
simply the motivation.  Ibid.  We relied on the fact that 
history is filled with examples of men and women who 
rendered highly effective performance without the conven-
tional badges of accomplishment in terms of certificates, 
diplomas, or degrees.  Diplomas and tests are useful ser-
vants, but Congress has mandated the commonsense 
 
4 Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750, 756 (1979) (interpreting 
§14(b) of the ADEA in light of §706(c) of Title VII); Western Air Lines, 
Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U. S. 400, 416 (1985) (interpreting ADEAs bona 
fide occupational qualification exception in light of Title VIIs BFOQ 
exception); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U. S. 111, 121 
(1985) (interpreting the ADEA to apply to denial of privileges cases in a 
similar manner as under Title VII). 
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proposition that they are not to become masters of reality.  
Id., at 433.  And we noted that the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which had enforcement 
responsibility, had issued guidelines that accorded with 
our view.  Id., at 433434.  We thus squarely held that 
§703(a)(2) of Title VII did not require a showing of dis-
criminatory intent.5 
 While our opinion in Griggs relied primarily on the 
purposes of the Act, buttressed by the fact that the EEOC 
had endorsed the same view, we have subsequently noted 
that our holding represented the better reading of the 
statutory text as well.  See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & 
Trust, 487 U. S. 977, 991 (1988).  Neither §703(a)(2) nor the 
comparable language in the ADEA simply prohibits ac-
tions that limit, segregate, or classify persons; rather the 
language prohibits such actions that deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 
affect his status as an employee, because of such individ-
uals race or age.  Ibid. (explaining that in disparate-
impact cases, the employers practices may be said to 
 
5 The congressional purposes on which we relied in Griggs have a 
striking parallel to two important points made in the Wirtz Report.  
Just as the Griggs opinion ruled out discrimination based on racial 
animus as a problem in that case, the Wirtz Report concluded that 
there was no significant discrimination of that kind so far as older 
workers are concerned.  Wirtz Report 23.  And just as Griggs recognized 
that the high school diploma requirement, which was unrelated to job 
performance, had an unfair impact on African-Americans who had 
received inferior educational opportunities in segregated schools, 401 
U. S., at 430, the Wirtz Report identified the identical obstacle to the 
employment of older workers.  Any formal employment standard 
which requires, for example, a high school diploma will obviously work 
against the employment of many older workersunfairly if, despite his 
limited schooling, an older workers years of experience have given him 
the relevant equivalent of a high school education.  Wirtz Report 21.  
Thus, just as the statutory text is identical, there is a remarkable 
similarity between the congressional goals we cited in Griggs and those 
present in the Wirtz Report. 
6
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Opinion of STEVENS, J. 
adversely affect [an individuals status] as an employee  
(alteration in original) (quoting 42 U. S. C. §2000e
2(a)(2))).  Thus the text focuses on the effects of the action 
on the employee rather than the motivation for the action 
of the employer.6 
 Griggs, which interpreted the identical text at issue 
here, thus strongly suggests that a disparate-impact the-
ory should be cognizable under the ADEA.7  Indeed, for 
 
6 In reaching a contrary conclusion, JUSTICE OCONNOR ignores key 
textual differences between §4(a)(1), which does not encompass-
disparate-impact liability, and §4(a)(2).  Section (a)(1) makes it unlaw-
ful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . 
because of such individuals age.  (Emphasis added.)  The focus of the 
section is on the employers actions with respect to the targeted indi-
vidual.  Paragraph (a)(2), however, makes it unlawful for an employer 
to limit . . . his employees in any way that would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individuals 
age.  (Emphasis added.)  Unlike in paragraph (a)(2), there is thus an 
incongruity between the employers actionswhich are focused on his 
employees generallyand the individual employee who adversely 
suffers because of those actions.  Thus, an employer who classifies his 
employees without respect to age may still be liable under the terms of 
this paragraph if such classification adversely affects the employee 
because of that employees agethe very definition of disparate impact.  
JUSTICE OCONNOR is therefore quite wrong to suggest that the textual 
differences between the two paragraphs are unimportant. 
7 JUSTICE OCONNOR reaches a contrary conclusion based on the text 
of the statute, the legislative history, and the structure of the statute.  
As we explain above, n. 6, supra, her textual reasoning is not persua-
sive.  Further, while Congress may have intended to remedy disparate-
impact type situations through noncoercive measures in part, there is 
nothing to suggest that it intended such measures to be the sole method 
of achieving the desired result of remedying practices that had an 
adverse effect on older workers.  Finally, we agree that the differences 
between age and the classes protected in Title VII are relevant, and 
that Congress might well have intended to treat the two differently.  
See infra, at 7 (OCONNOR, J., concurring in judgment).   However, 
Congress obviously considered those classes of individuals to be suffi-
ciently similar to warrant enacting identical legislation, at least with 
respect to employment practices it sought to prohibit.  While those 
7
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over two decades after our decision in Griggs, the Courts 
of Appeal uniformly interpreted the ADEA as authorizing 
recovery on a disparate-impact theory in appropriate 
cases.8  It was only after our decision in Hazen Paper Co. 
v. Biggins, 507 U. S. 604 (1993), that some of those courts 
concluded that the ADEA did not authorize a disparate-
impact theory of liability.9  Our opinion in Hazen Paper, 
however, did not address or comment on the issue we 
decide today.  In that case, we held that an employees 
allegation that he was discharged shortly before his pen-
sion would have vested did not state a cause of action 
under a disparate-treatment theory.  The motivating factor 
was not, we held, the employees age, but rather his years 
 
differences, coupled with a difference in the text of the statue such as the 
RFOA provision, may warrant addressing disparate-impact claims in 
the two statutes differently, see infra, at 1112, it does not justify 
departing from the plain text and our settled interpretation of that text. 
8 B. Lindemann & D. Kadue, Age Discrimination in Employment Law 
416, and n. 16 (2003) (citing Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797 F. 2d 36, 37 (CA1 
1986); Maresco v. Evans Chemetics, 964 F. 2d 106, 115 (CA2 1992); Blum 
v. Witco Chemical Corp., 829 F. 2d 367, 372 (CA3 1987); Wooden v.  Board 
of Ed. of Jefferson Cty., Ky., 931 F. 2d 376, 379 (CA6 1991); Monroe v. 
United Airlines, 736 F. 2d 394, 404, n. 3 (CA7 1984); Dace v. ACF Indus-
tries, 722 F. 2d 374, 378 (CA8 1983), modified, 728 F. 2d 976 (1984) (per 
curiam); Palmer v. United States, 794 F. 2d 534, 536 (CA9 1986); Faulkner 
v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 3 F. 3d 1419 (CA10 1993) (assuming disparate-
impact theory); MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 922 F. 2d 766, 
771 (CA11 1991); Arnold v. United States Postal Service, 863 F. 2d 994, 
998 (CADC 1988) (assuming disparate-impact theory)). 
9 See, e.g., Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F. 3d 696, 700 (CA1 1999) 
([T]ectonic plates shifted when the Court decided [Hazen Paper] ); 
Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F. 3d 1042, 1048 (CA6 1998) 
([T]here is now considerable doubt as to whether a claim of age dis-
crimination may exist under a disparate-impact theory (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)).  See also Lindemann & Kadue, 
at 417418, n. 23 (collecting cases).  In contrast to the First, Seventh, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, which have held that there is no dispa-
rate-impact theory, the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits continue to 
recognize such a theory.  Id., at 417, and n. 22. 
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Opinion of STEVENS, J. 
of service, a factor that the ADEA did not prohibit an 
employer from considering when terminating an employee.  
Id., at 612.10  While we noted that disparate-treatment 
captures the essence of what Congress sought to prohibit 
in the ADEA, id., at 610, we were careful to explain that 
we were not deciding whether a disparate impact theory 
of liability is available under the ADEA . . . .  Ibid.  In 
sum, there is nothing in our opinion in Hazen Paper that 
precludes an interpretation of the ADEA that parallels our 
holding in Griggs. 
 The Court of Appeals categorical rejection of disparate-
impact liability, like JUSTICE OCONNORs, rested primar-
ily on the RFOA provision and the majoritys analysis of 
legislative history.  As we have already explained, we 
think the history of the enactment of the ADEA, with 
particular reference to the Wirtz Report, supports the pre-
Hazen Paper consensus concerning disparate-impact 
liability.  And Hazen Paper itself contains the response to 
the concern over the RFOA provision. 
 The RFOA provision provides that it shall not be unlaw-
ful for an employer to take any action otherwise prohib-
ited under subsectio[n] (a) . . . where the differentiation is 
based on reasonable factors other than age discrimina-
tion . . . .  81 Stat. 603.  In most disparate-treatment 
cases, if an employer in fact acted on a factor other than 
age, the action would not be prohibited under subsection 
(a) in the first place.  See Hazen Paper, 507 U. S., at 609 
([T]here is no disparate treatment under the ADEA when 
the factor motivating the employer is some feature other 
than the employees age.).  In those disparate-treatment 
cases, such as in Hazen Paper itself, the RFOA provision is 
simply unnecessary to avoid liability under the ADEA, 
 
10 We did note, however, that the challenged conduct was actionable 
under §510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.  
507 U. S., at 612. 
9
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since there was no prohibited action in the first place.  The 
RFOA provision is not, as JUSTICE OCONNOR suggests, a 
safe harbor from liability, post, at 5 (emphasis deleted), 
since there would be no liability under §4(a).  See Texas 
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 254 
(1981) (noting, in a Title VII case, that an employer can 
defeat liability by showing that the employee was rejected 
for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason without refer-
ence to an RFOA provision). 
 In disparate-impact cases, however, the allegedly oth-
erwise prohibited activity is not based on age.  Ibid. 
( [C]laims that stress disparate impact [by contrast] 
involve employment practices that are facially neutral in 
their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall 
more harshly on one group than another . . .  (quoting 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 335336, n. 15 
(1977))).  It is, accordingly, in cases involving disparate-
impact claims that the RFOA provision plays its principal 
role by precluding liability if the adverse impact was 
attributable to a nonage factor that was reasonable.  
Rather than support an argument that disparate impact is 
unavailable under the ADEA, the RFOA provision actually 
supports the contrary conclusion.11 
 Finally, we note that both the Department of Labor, 
which initially drafted the legislation, and the EEOC, 
which is the agency charged by Congress with responsibil-
ity for implementing the statute, 29 U. S. C. §628, have 
consistently interpreted the ADEA to authorize relief on a 
disparate-impact theory.  The initial regulations, while not 
 
11 We note that if Congress intended to prohibit all disparate-impact 
claims, it certainly could have done so.  For instance, in the Equal Pay 
Act of 1963, 29 U. S. C. §206(d)(1), Congress barred recovery if a pay 
differential was based on any other factorreasonable or unreason-
ableother than sex.  The fact that Congress provided that employees 
could use only reasonable factors in defending a suit under the ADEA is 
therefore instructive. 
10
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mentioning disparate impact by name, nevertheless per-
mitted such claims if the employer relied on a factor that 
was not related to age.  29 CFR §860.103(f)(1)(i) (1970) 
(barring physical fitness requirements that were not 
reasonably necessary for the specific work to be per-
formed).  See also §1625.7 (2004) (setting forth the stan-
dards for a disparate-impact claim). 
 The text of the statute, as interpreted in Griggs, the 
RFOA provision, and the EEOC regulations all support 
petitioners view.  We therefore conclude that it was error 
for the Court of Appeals to hold that the disparate-impact 
theory of liability is categorically unavailable under the 
ADEA. 
IV 
 Two textual differences between the ADEA and Title VII 
make it clear that even though both statutes authorize 
recovery on a disparate-impact theory, the scope of dispa-
rate-impact liability under ADEA is narrower than under 
Title VII.  The first is the RFOA provision, which we have 
already identified.  The second is the amendment to Title 
VII contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 
1071.  One of the purposes of that amendment was to 
modify the Courts holding in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio, 490 U. S. 642 (1989), a case in which we narrowly 
construed the employers exposure to liability on a dispa-
rate-impact theory.  See Civil Rights Act of 1991, §2, 105 
Stat. 1071.  While the relevant 1991 amendments ex-
panded the coverage of Title VII, they did not amend the 
ADEA or speak to the subject of age discrimination.  
Hence, Wards Coves pre-1991 interpretation of Title VIIs 
identical language remains applicable to the ADEA. 
 Congress decision to limit the coverage of the ADEA by 
including the RFOA provision is consistent with the fact 
that age, unlike race or other classifications protected by 
Title VII, not uncommonly has relevance to an individuals 
11
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capacity to engage in certain types of employment.  To be 
sure, Congress recognized that this is not always the case, 
and that society may perceive those differences to be 
larger or more consequential than they are in fact.  How-
ever, as Secretary Wirtz noted in his report, certain cir-
cumstances . . . unquestionably affect older workers more 
strongly, as a group, than they do younger workers.  
Wirtz Report 28.  Thus, it is not surprising that certain 
employment criteria that are routinely used may be rea-
sonable despite their adverse impact on older workers as a 
group.  Moreover, intentional discrimination on the basis 
of age has not occurred at the same levels as discrimina-
tion against those protected by Title VII.  While the ADEA 
reflects Congress intent to give older workers employment 
opportunities whenever possible, the RFOA provision 
reflects this historical difference. 
 Turning to the case before us, we initially note that 
petitioners have done little more than point out that the 
pay plan at issue is relatively less generous to older work-
ers than to younger workers.  They have not identified any 
specific test, requirement, or practice within the pay plan 
that has an adverse impact on older workers.  As we held 
in Wards Cove, it is not enough to simply allege that there 
is a disparate impact on workers, or point to a generalized 
policy that leads to such an impact.  Rather, the employee 
is  responsible for isolating and identifying the specific 
employment practices that are allegedly responsible for 
any observed statistical disparities.   490 U. S., at 656 
(emphasis added) (quoting Watson, 487 U. S., at 994).  
Petitioners have failed to do so.  Their failure to identify 
the specific practice being challenged is the sort of omis-
sion that could result in employers being potentially 
liable for the myriad of innocent causes that may lead to 
statistical imbalances . . . .   490 U. S., at 657.  In this 
case not only did petitioners thus err by failing to identify 
the relevant practice, but it is also clear from the record 
12
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that the Citys plan was based on reasonable factors other 
than age. 
 The plan divided each of five basic positionspolice 
officer, master police officer, police sergeant, police lieu-
tenant, and deputy police chiefinto a series of steps and 
half-steps.  The wage for each range was based on a sur-
vey of comparable communities in the Southeast.  Em-
ployees were then assigned a step (or half-step) within 
their position that corresponded to the lowest step that 
would still give the individual a 2% raise.  Most of the 
officers were in the three lowest ranks; in each of those 
ranks there were officers under age 40 and officers over 
40.  In none did their age affect their compensation.  The 
few officers in the two highest ranks are all over 40.  Their 
raises, though higher in dollar amount than the raises 
given to junior officers, represented a smaller percentage 
of their salaries, which of course are higher than the sala-
ries paid to their juniors.  They are members of the class 
complaining of the disparate impact of the award. 
 Petitioners evidence established two principal facts: 
First, almost two-thirds (66.2%) of the officers under 40 
received raises of more than 10% while less than half 
(45.3%) of those over 40 did.12  Second, the average per-
centage increase for the entire class of officers with less 
than five years of tenure was somewhat higher than the 
percentage for those with more seniority.13  Because older 
officers tended to occupy more senior positions, on average 
they received smaller increases when measured as a per-
centage of their salary.  The basic explanation for the 
differential was the Citys perceived need to raise the 
salaries of junior officers to make them competitive with 
comparable positions in the market. 
 Thus, the disparate impact is attributable to the Citys 
 
12 Exhibit C, Record 1192. 
13 App. to Pet. for Cert. 41a.  
13
et al.: Panel: Age Discrimination Issues in Higher Education - Handout: S
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decision to give raises based on seniority and position.  
Reliance on seniority and rank is unquestionably reason-
able given the Citys goal of raising employees salaries to 
match those in surrounding communities.  In sum, we 
hold that the Citys decision to grant a larger raise to 
lower echelon employees for the purpose of bringing sala-
ries in line with that of surrounding police forces was a 
decision based on a reasonable factor other than age that 
responded to the Citys legitimate goal of retaining police 
officers.  Cf. MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 922 
F. 2d 766, 772 (CA11 1991). 
 While there may have been other reasonable ways for the 
City to achieve its goals, the one selected was not unreason-
able.  Unlike the business necessity test, which asks 
whether there are other ways for the employer to achieve 
its goals that do not result in a disparate impact on a 
protected class, the reasonableness inquiry includes no 
such requirement. 
 Accordingly, while we do not agree with the Court of 
Appeals holding that that the disparate-impact theory of 
recovery is never available under the ADEA, we affirm its 
judgment. 
It is so ordered. 
 THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the decision of this 
case. 
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